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I. INTRODUCTION

Fraud and abuse are pervasive problems in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, the solution to which has eluded Congress for many years. Although
congressional investigators estimate that only 5% of program providers
participate in fraudulent activity, that percentage translates into a loss of $40
billion a year, approximately 10% of all U.S. medical costs.1 It is only in the last
twenty years that Congress has taken affirmative steps to eradicate this evil
through legislative efforts collectively known as the Medicare and Medicaid

1
Jack Anderson & Donald Robinson, Isn't it Time To Clean Up Medicare, PARADE
MAGAZiNE, November 8,1992 at8. Congressional investigators estimate that fraud and
abuse account for more than 10 percent of all U.S. medical costs- as much as $40 billion
a year.
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Anti-kickback Statute (hereinafter "MMAKS").2 Since the enactment of the
MMAKS in 1972, the Office of the Inspector General (hereinafter "OIG"), a

2
Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1877(b), 1909(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419
(1974)[hereinafter "OriginalMMAKE']; Act of Oct. 25,1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142,1877(b),
1909(b), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180 (1977) [hereinafter "Amended MMAKS"]; Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499,94 Stat. 2599 (1980) [hereinafter "ORA"];
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93,
S. 14,101 Stat. 680 (1987) [hereinafter "MMPPPA"].The current MMAKS codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994) provides:
(b) Illegal remunerations
(1) whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing
or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of
this chapter or a State health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility,
service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for
the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made
in whole or part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health
care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or
a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of
services or other entity under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a
State health care program if the reduction in price is properly disclosed
and appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by
provider or entity under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State
health care program;
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona
fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment in
the provision of covered items or services;
(C) any amount paid by a vendor of goods or services to a person authorized to act as a purchasing agent for a group of individuals or entities who
are furnishing services reimbursed under subchapter XVIII of this chapter
or a State health care program if(i) the person has a written contract, with each such individual or
entity, which specifies the amount to be paid the person, which
amount may be a fixed amount or a fixed percentage of the value
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division of the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter "HHS"),
has been charged with safeguarding the integrity of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. Since then, the JIG has secured over 500 convictions, judgments,
and settlements under the MMAKS. 3
Recent developments, including the introduction of the prospective
payment system (hereinafter "PPS"), have led federally funded medical
providers to argue that the broad judicial interpretation applied to the MMAKS
has left them disadvantaged in a competitive health care market. Moreover,
health care providers contend that Congress' latest attempt at clarifying the
MMAKS, the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of
1987 (hereinafter "MMPPPA"), provides little guidance for MMAKS
compliance. 4 As a result, program participants insist that they have no recourse
other than to enter into joint ventures and business arrangements in violation
of the MMAKS. 5
This argument, taken in light of the purpose and judicial interpretation of
the MMAKS, in conjunction with the MMPPPA's finalized regulations, is
patently erroneous. The MMAKS was enacted to specifically address the use
of federal health care funds. 6 Although initially weak in curbing fraud and
abuse, the MMAKS has since been modified and augmented, resulting in
greater clarity and an increased number of convictions. Furthermore, the
MMPPPA regulations provide clear and concise language for MMAKS
compliance. 7 These regulations, more commonly known as "safe harbors,"

of the purchases made by each such individual or entity under the
contract, and
(ii) in the case of an entity that is a provider of services (as defined
in § 1395x(u) of this title), the person discloses (in such form and
manner as the Secretary requires) to the entity and, upon request,
to the Secretary the amount received from each such vendor with
respect to purchases made by or on behalf of the entity;
(D) a waiver of any coinsurance under part B of subchapter XVIH of this
chapter by a Federally qualified health care center with respect to an
individual who qualifies for subsidized services under a provision of the
Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.]; and
(E) any payment practice specified by the Secretary in regulations promulgated pursuant to section 14(a) of the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and

Program Protection Act of 1987.
3

INSPECTOR GEN. 1991 ANN. REP., DEiyr. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvICES 2 (1992).
Although prosecutions have been few, the OIG has received more than 1,250 allegations
of violations of the anti-kickback statute since 1987. After screening the allegations, the
OIG opened some 800 cases. Id.
4

MMPPPA, supranote 2. See also 56 Fed. Reg. §35,952 (1991).

5

Howard Lankin, Most Joint Ventures Unlikely to be in a Safe Harbor,AM. MED. NEWS,
Aug. 26,1991, at 11.
6

Carrie Valiant, HHS Inspector General Publishes Final Safe Harbor Regulations, 17

PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, issue n5, at 34 (Sept.-Oct. 1991).
7

See 56 Fed. Reg. §35,952 (1991); see also MMPPPA,supra note 2, § 14.
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provide detailed explanations of exempt business arrangements that would
otherwise be subject to prosecution.
This Note will briefly explore the history of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs including the introduction of the PPS. Next, the Note will detail the
legislative history surrounding the adoption of the MMAKS and the judicial
interpretation applied to its elements. The Note will follow with an analysis of
the purpose, goals, and disagreements relating to the MMPPPA's "Safe Harbor"
regulations, resolving their alleged ambiguity against the medical profession.
Finally, the Note will advocate support of the recently proposed Health Care
Cost Containment and Reform Act of 1992 with emphasis on increasing the
budget and size of the staff within the Office of the Inspector General. 8
II. BACKGROUND

A. History of Medicareand MedicaidPrograms
The Medicare and Medicaid programs were the result of governmental
efforts to establish additional public health care for the elderly and poor.9 As
codified in Title 18 and 19 of the Social Security Act respectively, these programs
provide reimbursement to health care providers for medical services rendered
to qualified candidates. 10
The payment system of the Medicare and Medicaid programs has been
reformed several times in an attempt to curtail the spiraling cost of health care.
Formerly, payment to providers was accomplished through a retrospective cost
reimbursement program (hereinafter "RRP").11 As a result of this payment

8
HOUSE SUBCOMMITrEE ON HEALTH REPORTS HEALTH CARE REFORM BILL, MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID GUIDE, (CCH), no. 704, at 4 (July 16,1992).

9
Health Insurance for the Aged Act [hereinafter HIA], Pub. L. No. 89-97,79 Stat. 291
(1965) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994)).

lOId.
11 Francis J. Hearn, Jr., Comment, Curing the Health Care Industry: Government
Response to Medicare Fraudand Abuse, 5 J.CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 175 (1989). See
also 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1982).
Medicare Part A provides: basic protection against the costs of hospital, related
post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care services. Part A covers inpatient
hospital care, skilled nursing facility services, qutpatient rehabilitation facilities.
Beneficiaries include persons over the age of 65 and disabled persons entitled to Social
Security benefits. A physician is not usually reimbursed by Medicare directly, instead
it is through a third party intermediary which is a third party private insurance plan
acting under contract with the Department of Health and Human Services. Effective
1983, the provider of health care services received reimbursement under Part A based
on reasonable costs.
Medicare PartB provides: supplementary health insurance coverage to Part A and
largely covers physician services. Other covered services include durable medical
equipment, ambulatory surgical center services, and hospital outpatient services. Part
B is voluntary program available to those who are eligible for Part A. Financing is
provided by monthly premiums paid by enrollees and by general federal revenues. This
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method, providers were actually rewarded for inappropriate or inefficient
care.12 Due to the extraordinary growth and cost of the programs, combined
with the ever-increasing federal budget, regulatory and congressional efforts
resulted in shifting reimbursement to the ppS.13
Under this plan, a hospital or medical facility is only reimbursed a fixed,
predetermined sum for treatment rendered, regardless of the actual cost of the
medical service provided to the patient.14 The payment for services is based on
a categorized listing encompassing 470 illnesses known as diagnostic related
groupings (hereinafter "DRG's"). 15 This can cause a hospital or other medical
service to face a loss if the costs for an individual patient exceeds the allotted
DRG amount. As a result of PPS, medical services are provided with the
incentive to deliver health care economically and to discharge patients quickly
16
in order to retain any excess payment.
Nonetheless, today's medical providers argue that current medical care
competition and the PPS shift such a substantial financial burden to
participating health care facilities that efficiency requires expansion of clientele
and services to increase revenue and profit margin.17 Many of these revenue
enhancement schemes involve fraudulent activity. These fraudulent
arrangements, formulated by medical providers to gain revenue, sacrifice
program integrity and taxpayer monies. This is the conduct which runs afoul
of the MMAKS' legislative intent and statutory prohibitions. An analysis of the
legislative history surrounding the adoption of the MMAKS demonstrates
congressional efforts to eradicate fraud and abuse.
B. Legislative History
Since their creation in 1965, the Medicare and Medicaid programs have been
the target of numerous fraudulent schemes. 18 Prior to 1972, the Social Security
Act contained only one penalty provision relating to the making of false

insurance generally covers 80% of a physician's reasonable charge. Administration of
the program is again through a third party fiscal agent termed a carrier. Id.
12 Cf. Mark P. Hall, InstitutionalControl of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431 (1988) (discussing professional and
institutional influences on treatment decisions).
13
Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §601-07,97 Stat. 65,149-72
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §1395c (1994)). The programs are federally-initiated, but
state-administered. This deregulative structure provides loopholes for fraudulent
activity. Congress altered the payment system to curtail further fraud and abuse in the
government based programs.
14

Heam, supra note 11, at 175.

15

1d.

16
17

1d.
1d.

18 See generally HA, supra note 9.
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statements or misrepresentations of material fact.1 9 As such, the Social Security
Act's limited language hindered prosecutorial efforts. Accordingly, Medicare
and Medicaid fraud was prosecuted under federal statutes prohibiting
20
conspiracies to defraud the government and prohibiting mail fraud.
Unfortunately, these statutes required the government to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the prohibited acts were done "knowingly" and/or
willfully."21
In an attempt to directly combat fraud and abuse in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs, Congress enacted the MMAKS as part of the Social
Security Amendments of 1972.22 These sections (hereinafter "Original
MMAKS") eliminated two prosecutorial problems while providing
prosecutors with an enforcement tool more specifically tailored to the medical
profession. First, the scope of prohibited conduct was expanded to include
soliciting, offering or accepting kickbacks, bribes, or rebates. 23 Secondly, these

1942 U.S.C. §1307(a) (1982) provides:
[W]hoever, with the intent to defraud any person, shall make or cause
to be made any false representation concerning the requirements of this
chapter, subchapter E of Chapter 1 or subchapter A, C, or E of Chapter 9
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, or of any rules or regulations issued
thereunder, knowing such representation to be false, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year,
or both.
20
See 18 U.S.C. §1341 (1994) (Mail Fraud Statute); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (Conspiracy
to Defraud Govt.) The 1972 versions of each statute are equivalent to the current
versions of each with respect to claims or prosections that would have been brought
under the 1972 version.
21
id.
22

OriginalMMAKS, supra note 2. § 1877(b) of the Act provides:
Whoever furnishes items or services to an individual for which payment
is or may be made under this title and who solicits, offers, or receives any(1) kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing of such items or
services or the making or receipt of such payment, or
(2) rebate of any fee or charge for referring any such individual to
another person for the furnishing of such items or services
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be find not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
§1909(b) of the Act provides:
Whoever furnishes items or services to an individual for which payment
is or may be made in whole or in part out of Federal funds under a State
plan approved under this title and who solicits, offers, or receives any(1) kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing of such items or
services or the making or receipt of such payment, or
(2) rebate of any fee or charge for referring any such individual to
another person for the furnishing of such items or services
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be find not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
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sections eliminated the requirement that the prohibited conduct be performed
"knowingly" and/or "willfully," thereby holding violators strictly liable.24
Although the Original MMAKS lacked a mens rea element, relieving the
prosecution of proving its greatest impediment to conviction, fraud and abuse
continued to escalate in the programs. As a consequence of extensive
fraudulent activities, Congress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud
and Abuse Amendments in 1977 (hereinafter the "Amended MMAKS"). 25 The
express purpose of the Amended MMAKS was to strengthen the capacity of
the government to detect, prosecute, and punish fraudulent activities under
26
the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
The Amended MMAKS expanded and clarified the scope of the Original
MMAKS' terminology by prohibiting the solicitation or receipt of "any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe or rebate), directly or indirectly,
overtly or covertly, in cash or kind."27 To further encourage statutory
compliance, the penalty for a violation was elevated to a felony, punishable by
a fine of up to $25,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than five years. 28
Despite the overriding desire to eradicate fraudulent activity, Congress
created two prosecutorial exceptions designed to foster competition and good
business practices among medical providers. These exemptions amounted to
discounts within and payments pursuant to bona fide employment
relationships. 29 Overall, the statutory provisions were intended to effectuate
vigorous prosecutions in light of a serious and pervasive fraud problem.
In 1980, Congress, realizing the potential for prosecuting individuals whose
conduct, while improper, was inadvertent, enacted the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1980 (hereinafter "ORA"). The ORA required, among
other things, that the prohibited conduct be performed "knowingly and
willfully" before it be deemed a violation of the MMAKS. 30 Ironically, the
addition of this element reinstated the very element eliminated by the Original

24

1d. (absence of "knowingly" and/or "willfully" language).

25

Amended MMAKS, supra note 2, § 1877(b) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(b)).
26
See generally Joseph T. Sebastianilli, Health Care in the 90's and Beyond: Practice
Structure, Competition, Government Regulation, and Malpractice Concerns, A.L.I.,
September 14, 1989, at 97. "Fraud in these health care programs adversely impacts on
all Americans, who must bear the financial burden from misuse of funds and diverts
funds from those most in need, the elderly and poor." Id.
2742 US.C. § 1395 (1977) (emphasis added), recodified as 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(b)(1994) byMMPPPA, supranote4. For a detailed discussion of whatpayment
arrangements qualify as remunerations, see discussion, part II. B. 2, infra.
2842 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994).
2942 U.S.C. § 1396(b)(3)(A)(1982), recodified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A) and
(B)(1994).
30ORA of 1980, supra note 2.
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MMAKS as an impediment to successful prosecution. 31 So, although Congress'
actions evidence an obvious intent to increase the enforceability of the
MMAKS, it in fact compromised its position by requiring a mens rea element
to be proven in each case.
In the years following the introduction of the PPS, a dramatic increase in the
number of complaints from medical providers culminated in the enactment of
the MMPPPA in 1987.32 The purpose of the Act, like the Amended MMAKS,
was to clarify those arrangements permissible under the MMAKS. 33 The
MMPPPA mandated, among other things, that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services promulgate regulations (conventionally labelled "safe
harbors") designating certain payment practices and business arrangements as
exempt from criminal prosecution. 34 An in-depth discussion of the past case
law interpreting the MMAKS is necessary for a full understanding and
application of these recently-enacted safe harbors.
Il1. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
A. OriginalKickback Statute
With the exception of two early cases, federal courts have been consistent in
their interpretation of the MMAKS. 35 Judicial construction of the 1972 statute
primarily focused on the appropriate definition of the terms "kickback" and
"bribe." United States v. Zacher,36 one of these early exceptions, is illustrative of
the problems faced by prosecutors under the narrow judicial interpretation
applied to the limited language of the Original MMAKS. In Zacher, the
defendant operated a nursing home and charged all patients $29 per day.
Medicaid, regardless of the actual cost to the facility, would reimburse the
operation only $25 per day. Consequently, Zacher admitted Medicaid patients
on the understanding that they or their families would either37supplement
Medicaid by paying the $4 difference, or would forgo treatment.
The government initially secured a conviction, arguing that the
supplementary payments required by the facility during the years of 1973 and
1974 were bribes in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b) (formerly §1909(b) as

31

See OriginalMMAKS, supra note 2.

32

MMPPPA, supranote 4. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(E) (1994).

33

Sebastenilli, supra note 25, at 97-98. "Purpose of amendments: a. clarify and
restructure those provisions in existing law which define types of financial
arrangements and conduct to be classified as illegal under medicare/medicaid." Id.
34

MMPPPA, supra note 2, § 14.

35

See, United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Zacher,
586 F.2d 912 (2nd Cir. 1978).
36

Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2nd Cir. 1978).
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amended).38 The Second Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that in the absence of any misapplication of government funds increasing the
cost of the programs, or any definitive interpretation of the statutory language,
the traditional common law understanding of the word "bribe" should be
utilized. 39 Accordingly, Zacher was acquitted because his intent was not
"corrupt."
Within a year of Zacher,the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Porter,40 reversed
a fraud conviction based on a narrow definition applied to another statutory
term, "kickback." In Porter,the defendant physicians, rather than bill Medicare
directly or use an inexpensive computerized facility would send blood samples
to a manual laboratory operated by Porter. Porter in turn paid the defendant
physicians up to $35 of the total $214 reimbursement he received from
Medicare. The defendant physicians, in cooperation with Porter, set up a
dummy corporation to act as a conduit between the laboratory and doctors for
the sole purpose of distributing the payments. The defendants then claimed
4
that these payments represented legitimate "handling fees." 1
This was a case of first impression for the Fifth Circuit. 42 The court, using
reasoning similar to that in Zacher, stated that in the absence of any definitive
statutory guidance, a kickback
[i]n ordinary parlance ... is a secret return to an earlier possessor of
part of a sum received... [and further] involves a corrupt payment or
receipt of payment in violation of the duty imposed by Congress on
providers of services to use federal43funds only for intended purposes
and only in the approved manner.

38

1d. at 916.

39Id.

[Clourts have consistently understood the word "bribe" to encompass acts
that are malum in se because they entail either a breach of trust or duty or
the corrupt selling of what our society deems not to be legitimately for sale
.... It is this element of corruption that distinguishes a bribe from a legitimate payment for services.
Id.
40

United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (Sth Cir. 1979). Porter's activities occurred
during a 3-year span from 1973 to 1975. Further, Porter was under no statutory duty to
use automated services, as opposed to the selected manual hand-operated services, and
consequently did not violate the statutory proscriptions by receiving a portion of a
lawful Medicare payment to a laboratory for his referral of patients. Id. at 1054.
41

1d. at 1051. The Court upheld a doctor's right to receive 'lhandling fees" from
laboratory and classified the payment as a legitimate arrangement rather than
unacceptable kickbacks. Id. at 1054.
42
1d. at 1053. As opposed to Zacher's Medicaid charge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1396h(b), Porterwas charged under the Medicare provision of § 1395nn(b).
43

/d. at 1054.
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Applying this reasoning, the Fifth Circuit determined that no kickback
existed. The defendants' activities were not found to fall within the meaning
of the statute because: (1) the funds being received were not funds being
returned to an earlier possessor, (2) the defendants were not public officials
having their judgment corrupted, and (3) the defendants were not persons on
whom Congress had imposed a statutory duty.44
The court's narrow construction asserted, in effect, that once the laboratory
received a lawful fee, the Original MMAKS seemed to impose no restrictions
on what the lab could do with the payment. Therefore, the defendants'
characterization of the kickback as a "handling fee" was legitimate. 45 Moreover,
although the Porter activity transpired over a three-year-period prior to 1977,
the court relied on the legislative intent of the Amended MMAKS as a
foundation for defendants' acquittal.
Congress completely changed the wording of the statute and made the
description of the crime much more specific. The legislative history
clearly indicates that the reason for this substantial alteration of the
wording was the fact that Congress and many United States Attorneys
believed "that the existing language . . . is unclear and needs
clarification." If the meaning of the 1972 version of 42 U.S.C. §
1395nn(b) was not clear and precise to the Congress and to the United
States Attorneys charged with enforcing the law, we are hard put to
say, with that degree of confidence required in a criminal conviction,
that these defendants were given clear warning by the statute that46their
conduct was prohibited by it, thus amounting to a criminal act.
The flaws of the Original MMAKS, illustrated by this legislative analysis,
virtually mandated the Porter result. The Porterdecision became a powerful
tool in defense of Medicare and Medicaid cases arising before the Amended
MMAKS took effect. Defense attorneys relied upon Porter to argue that a
"kickback" cannot refer to a payment made to a party other than the party who
initially transferred the sum to the payor.47 This interpretation, however, did
not prevail in subsequent decisions. Instead, the judiciary acknowledging the
myriad of ways in which fraudulent kickback schemes could be accomplished,
turned to the intent with which the defendants' conduct was undertaken, the
substance of the transaction, and a broader interpretation of the MMAKS'
elements for subsequent determinations. A series of decisions in the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits exemplifies this trend.48
44

1d.

45591 F.2d at 1054.
46d. (citations omitted).
47

1d.

48

See United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tapert,
625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); United States v. Ruttenberg, 625
F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1979).
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In United States v. Hancock,49 the defendant chiropractors prepared and sent
tissue samples to a clinical laboratory for testing. The laboratory would then
bill Medicaid directly for its services and include in the bill the cost of the
preparation services performed by the defendants. Upon receiving
reimbursement from Medicaid, the laboratory paid the defendants for their
preparation or "handling fees."50
Although similar to the Porterscheme, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of the term "kickback" and reversed the lower court's
ruling.5 1 The court applied a common usage to the term, designating it as a
"percentage payment for... granting assistance by one in a position to open
or control a source of income."52 The defendants, as the court described, were
undoubtedly able to control the payment of federal funds to the laboratory by
sending Medicare or Medicaid patient tissue specimens to the laboratory.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Zacher court, stating that the
intent behind the 1972 statute was to decrease the costs to the
Medicare/Medicaid programs by reducing fraud and abuse. Accordingly, the
Hancock payment scheme, adding an alleged "handling fee" to the legitimate
cost of the transaction, was the sort of "evils Congress sought to prevent by
enacting the kickback statutes."53 Thus, the potential for increased program
costs was the equivalent of the corrupt element announced in Zacher, and the
allegation that the defendants received payments in return for their decision to
send specimens to Chem-Tech satisfied it.5
In United States v. Ruttenberg,SS the Seventh Circuit adopted the Hancock
analysis, finding that payments from a pharmaceutical service to a nursing
home for the opportunity to sell its drugs were kickbacks in violation of the
Original MMAKS. The court stated that Congress' adoption of the term
"kickback" was fully understood by Congress itself and the public to "mean the
56
transfer back to one having control of the original payment."
49604 F.2d at 999. Hancock's activities took place prior to the 1977 amendments,
although the ruling came after.
50ld. at 1001.
SlId. at 1002.
52 Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD

NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1966).

3

5 Hancock, 604 F.2d at 1001.
54 Id.
SSRuttenberg, 625 F.2d at 177. Ruttenberg's activities, similar to Hancock's, took place
before the 1977 amendment even though the ruling came after.
56

Id.

Though we are concerned with the law, not the ethics of the medical

profession ... it should be noted that the law does not make increased
cost to the government the sole criterion of corruption... [N]or need
Congress have spelled out duties, beyond the duty of avoiding receipt
and payment of kickbacks.
Id. at 177, n.9 (citations omitted).
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The Ruttenberg defendants attempted to distinguish their case from that of
Hancock. The defendants maintained that their pharmaceutical arrangement
posed no increased costs to the federal assistance programs due to government
price fixing.57 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and asserted that
even if the payments made by druggists to nursing home operators were not
paid out of federal funds, but were merely gifts from the druggists' profits, the
payments would still be kickbacks proscribed by the statute.5 8 '"Whether costs
were directly and immediately increased by those particular payments,
however, is irrelevant. The potential for increased costs if such 'fee' agreements
became an established method of business is clearly an evil with which the
court was concerned and one Congress sought to avoid in enacting' the
statute. 59
B. The Current Anti-kickback Statute: Clarificationfrom the 1977 Fraudand
Abuse Amendments
Congress' most encompassing attempts at clarifying the statutory terms of
the MMAKS by adoption of the 1977 Anti-Fraud and Abuse amendments
(Amended MMAKS), the ORA of 1980, and the MMPPPA of 1987 resulted in
apparently few, but substantially important changes to the Original MMAKS. 60
Before proceeding to a discussion of the MMPPPA and what arrangements
qualify for safe harbor protection, an analysis of the MMAKS' current statutory
language is imperative.
The current MMAKS sets forth four elements that must be found before a
violation can occur.61 The first element is that the remuneration must be made
in return for, or in order to induce the referral of, Medicare or Medicaid
business. 62 The second element that must be found before a violation of the

57

1d. at 176.
58/d. at 177. Ruttenberg in effect ruled that all that was required under the statute was
a payment of a kickback to those in control of federal funds. The referring or receiving
of a portion of those federal funds for the "opportunity" to provide services was the
equivalent of a non-approved use and therefore a kickback within the language of the
statute.

59Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d at 177.
60 See Amended MMAKS, ORA of 1980, and MMPPPAof 1987, supra note 2. The ORA
of 1980 added the requirement of specific intent. For one to be convicted, all offenses

must be done knowingly and willfully. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994).

6142 US.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994) Illegal Remunerations sets forth four elements:
1.) Knowingly and Willfully soliciting or receiving
2.) any remuneration...
3.) in return for referring...
4.) for which payment is made by Medicare or Medicaid.
Elements three (3) and four (4) as listed, and termed one (1) and two (2) within the text,

are so basic and obvious when met as to require no further discussion.
62
1d. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A), 2(A).
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current statute can occur is that the service, item, good, or facility must be paid
for in whole or part by Medicare or Medicaid. 63
The other two elements, the mens rea element and the "remuneration"
element, have been the subject of considerable judicial interpretation and, for
clarification, will be addressed individually.
1. The Mens Rea Element: "Knowingly and Willfully"
The current MMAKS provides that the prohibited act must be done
"knowingly" and "willfully."64 This element was inserted in 1980 as a result of
congressional intent to facilitate legitimate competitive activity.65 In the context
of the statute, the Medicare Intermediary Manual defines "knowingly" as "the
accused person is aware that a particular act would constitute a deception or
misrepresentation, but nevertheless proceeds to do it."66 'Willfully" is defined
as actions done "voluntarily, purposefully, deliberately and intentionally...."67
The intent element is the most important, disputed, and difficult element to
prove in all cases arising under the current MMAKS. In the seminal case of
United State v. Greber,68 the defendant, an osteopathic physician and president
of Cardio-Med Laboratory, Inc., provided physicians with heart monitoring
services for their Medicaid and Medicare patients. After removing the
monitors and analyzing and interpreting the data, Cardio-Med would bill
Medicare for the service and return the report, together with a 40% portion of
the Medicare reimbursement. The reimbursement was termed an
"interpretation fee" even though in most cases, the physicians merely signed
69
the reports previously translated and interpreted by Cardio-Med Analysts.
The defendants claimed that this payment scheme was legitimate since
Medicare allowed reimbursement and/or payment for physician
interpretation and evaluation. 70 "Absent a showing that the only purpose
behind the fee was to improperly induce future referrals," the defendants

63
d. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B)-(2)(B). This element is included in the provision to exclude
from prosecution activities which are associated with privately insured patients as
opposed to patients or recipients of Medicare and Medicaid.

64Id. at § 1320a-Tb(b) 1-2.
6

50RA, supra note 2.

66

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PART A INTERMEDIARY MANUAL
(HIM-13) P3454.1. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, US. DEPT. HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. 13-3 MEDICARE INTERMEDIARY MANUAL (pt. A), at 3454.1
(1985).
67
1d.
68

United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied., 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
69760 F.2d at 70.
70

1d. at 69-70. The court asserted that even if Medicare allowed for Medicare
reimbursements, the fixed percentage paid to the defendant was still violative of
Medicare's alloted service reimbursement.
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argued that "compensating a physician for services actually rendered could not
be a violation of the statute."71
The Third Circuit, in an expansive and comprehensive decision, rejected this
argument and affirmed the defendants' convictions. The court held that if
payments were made to a physician to induce future patient referrals, even if
the payments were in compensation for actual services rendered by the
physician, known as fee splitting, the MMAKS had been violated by both
parties. 72 In other words, if one purpose of the remuneration was to induce a
referral, then even if the remuneration was intended to primarily provide
compensation for professional services, the provider would have violated the
statute.73
The Grebercourt declared the test for business impropriety as the subjective
purpose for which the business participants' referrals were made. 74
Overutilization, one indicator to detect fraud, was the key in establishing
criminal intent in Greber.75 "If a suspicious financial arrangement is
accompanied by overutilization it can be inferred that the reason for the
overutilization is the financial benefit to the referring physician. Or, one might
say that if there was no financial benefit to the physician, why would he or she
engage in overutilization." 76
The Greber court's decision reflects a broad, although not inappropriate,
interpretation of the intent element. The court stated that the language and
purpose of the statute support the government's view in contrast to the
defendants' argument. 77 "[Clongress intended to combat financial incentives
to physicians for ordering particular services patients did not require... [tihe
statute is aimed at the inducement factor and the potential for unnecessary
78
drain on the Medicare system... .,
2. The "Remuneration" Element
The second disputed requirement for a violation of the MMAKS to occur is
that the prohibited conduct must involve a solicitation, receipt, offer, or pay-

71

1d. at 71.

72

1d. at 72.

73760 F.2d at 72.
74
d. The Court stated that the statute was aimed at the inducement factor so that
even if the physician performs some service for the money received, unnecessary drain
on the programs still exists.
75
Miller, The Greber Case, in MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE: UNDERSTANDING THE LAw
16,33 (1986).
76Id.
77

Greber,760 F.2d at 72.

78

Id. at 71.
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ment of any "remuneration (including any kickback, bribe or rebate)." 79 The
remuneration can be direct or indirect, overt or covert, in cash or kind. 80 The
addition of the "remuneration" element resolved the controversy under the
Original MMAKS concerning the definitive scope of the terms "kickback" and
'bribe."81 Cases following the enactment of the Amended MMAKS are
illustrative of this trend.
In United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, the Ninth Circuit, although
reversing a conviction under the 1977 provision, stated that "[t]he amendments
effectively eliminated any problems presented by the distinction between a
kickback or bribe and rebate ... , by making illegal all forms of improper
remuneration." 82 Thus, the provision now reaches any type of transaction
involving payment for referrals.
The Grebercourt endorsed the Stewart decision, relying on the intent of the
Amended MMAKS and its prior application in Hancock.83 The court clearly
defined "remunerates]" as "to pay an equivalent for service."84 The Grebercourt
asserted that by adding this term, Congress intended to expand the coverage
of the statute to situations where no service was rendered. The court stated that
the text refers to "any remuneration," which includes not only amounts for
which professional time was expended, but to those amounts for which no
actual service was performed. 8 5 While the Stewart and Greberdecisions clearly
illustrate the breadth of the Amended MMAKS, medical providers continue to
quarrel over the statute's ability to guide them toward legitimate business
arrangements.
C. Rejection of the Medical Profession'sArgument
The ease with which a conviction was obtained in Greber is not supportive
of the argument that the statute is ambiguous and provides little guidance for

7942 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
801d.
81

See H.R. 393, Part , 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 53 (1993), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
3039,3055-56. The insertion of the new "remuneration" language took care of the flaws
of the Original MMAKS, thereby reducing the validity of the Porterdecision. See supra
notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
82

United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratories, 652 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1981).

83

Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (1983).

Hancock strongly supports the government's position here, because the statute in that

case did not contain the word "remuneration." The court nevertheless held that
"kickback" sufficiently described the defendants' criminal activity. By adding

"remuneration" to the statute in the 1977 amendment, Congress sought to make it clear
that even if the transaction was not considered to be a "kickback" for which no service
had been rendered, payment nevertheless violated the Act.
Id. at 72 (citing United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999,1001 (7th Cir. 1979)).
841d. at 71 (citing WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1966).
851d.
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legitimate competitive practices. The Greber decision does not support any
claim that the amendments have unfairly constrained medical providers'
ability to create legitimate arrangements. In Greber, proving the intent element
was relatively easy. First, investigators found that Dr. Greber had testified at
the doctor didn't get his consulting
an earlier civil case to the effect that "[i]f
fee, [from the medicare funds already received], he wouldn't be using our
service. So the doctor got a consulting fee."86 This statement undoubtedly
exemplified an actual discemable intent on the part of the defendant to retain
future referrals from physicians. Secondly, Greber's utilization of the kickback
arrangement, over a two year period, contained a clear potential for the
87
unnecessary drain on the Medicare system.
Furthermore, the very effect of adding a mens rea element to the MMAKS
can only lead to complicated prosecutions resulting in a lack of convictions.
This outcome is directly at odds with the deterrent/punishment intent behind
the statute. Moreover, the U.S. Attorney's office, in cooperation with the
Inspector General's Office, has the discretion to prosecute. Under a different,
more legitimate remuneration arrangement, the prosecutors and courts may
determine that the payment and referral devices are too remote to violate the
Statute, distinguishing it from Greberand criminal sanctions.
The aforementioned problems manifest the difficulties in detecting and
punishing fraudulent activities. The addition of the mens rea element was a
prosecutorial sacrifice to placate medical providers who maintain they have no
other alternative but to utilize prohibited arrangements and practices to remain
efficient. The resultant alterations in the statutory language assist providers in
avoiding prosecutions, not promoting them. Medical providers should not be
condemning the legislative history of MMAKS. Hospitals, physicians and
other medical providers should be applauding congressional efforts for
striking a balance in an area so critical and complex that less than complete
detection of fraudulent activity will ultimately result in drastic detrimental
effects in the application and continuance of the government-based programs.
In summation, the MMAKS contains broad, but precise, language intended
to effectuate vigorous prosecutions of fraudulent financial arrangements. The
several court decisions mentioned earlier clearly illustrate this point. However,
with the introduction of the PPS in 1983,88 cries from medical providers for
further exemptions from the MMAKS began to surface. Congress, recognizing
that some aspects of PPS regulation could possibly cause inefficient medical
86

760 F.2d at 70.
In addition, defendant told physicians at the hospital that the Board of
Censors of the Philadelphia County Medical Society had said the referral
fee was legitimate if the physician shared the responsibility for the report.
Actually, the Society had stated that there should be separate bills because
"for the monitor company to offer payment to the physicians... is not

considered to be the method of choice." Id.
1d. at 71.

87
88

Heam, supra note 11, at 175.
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care, but acknowledging the fact that more complex and deceiving

arrangements were forthcoming, ratified the MMPPPA. 89 The MMPPPA was
the culmination of congressional intent to close the gaps of the Amended
MMAKS. This purpose is also achieved by MMPPPA mandating the Secretary
of HHS to define business arrangements that would be exempt from criminal
prosecution. 90 Our attention will now turn to an examination of these
exemptions, more conventionally labelled safe harbors.
IV. RESPONSE TO UNCERTAINTY-SAFE HARBORS ENACTED
Since the enactment of the Amended MMAKS, concern has arisen among a
number of health care providers that many relatively innocent, and even
beneficial, commercial arrangements may be subject to criminal sanctions. As
a result of broad judicial interpretation applied to the Amended MMAKS and
the 1982 adoption of the PPS, medical providers contend that they are forced
into adjusting operations through capital pooling and horizontal integration
to remain competitive and efficient.91 Expansion into new forms of health care
delivery may enable hospitals and other provider facilities to develop multiple
sources of revenue.
While this may be true, such arrangements increase the temptation to
improve profits under the guise of providing convenient patient services.
Notwithstanding this reality, Congress, in an effort to appease medical
providers by ensuring greater certainty concerning MMAKS compliance,
ordered the Secretary of the Department of HHS to issue regulations clearly
92
defining legal business arrangements.
The MMPPPA specifically provides two sections clarifying the Amended
MMAKS. Section two (2) authorizes the Office of the Inspector General to
exclude an individual or entity from participation in either program upon a
determination that the party engaged in a prohibited remuneration scheme. 93
This new sanction was intended to provide an alternate civil remedy, short of

89

MMPPPA, supranote 4, § 14(a).

90

1d. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(E) (1994).
91 David M. Frankford, Creatingand Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity:
Referrals among Health Providers,89 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (1989).
92

MMPPPA, supra note 2, § 14. Generally the provisions provide safe harbors for:
1) investments or ownership by referral sources,
2) space rental/lease arrangements,
3) equipment rentals/lease,
4) personal services/management contracts,
5) sale of physicians practices,
6) referral services,
7) discounts,
8) employee and group purchasing organizations,
9) waiver of co-insurance deductible amounts, and
10) warranties.

93

Social Security Act § 1128(b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b).
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criminal prosecution, that would be an effective way of regulating abusive
business practices. Section fourteen (14), which will be the focus of this part of
the article, mandated the promulgation of regulations specifying those
payment practices that would not be subject to criminal prosecution under
§1128(b) of the Social Security Act. 94 Although the rules were supposed to be
handed down within a year of the MMPPPA's enactment, several subsequent
revisions and recision for clarification delayed their final effective date until
July 1991.95
In all, the rules name some ten safe harbors where physicians and other
providers can take haven without fear of prosecution. 96 They cover a diverse
set of arrangements, including investments, sale of practices, employment
contracts, equipment rentals, space rentals/leases, personal service contracts,
discounts, warranties, and waiver of Medicare co-payments. 97 Perhaps the
greatest attention has focused on the safe harbors for investment interests and
space or equipment rental.
A. Investment Interests
The Secretary of HHS formulated this exception intending to demonstrate
that the HHS did not want to bar all investments by physicians in other health
care facilities to which they refer patients. 98 Under this regulation, the safe
harbor is intended to shelter two basic situations. The first situation involves
investment by physicians and other providers in large publicly-held entities.99
The second situation involves small entities, more specifically joint ventures. 100
It is this second situation that has given medical providers the most trouble,
because unlike the first situation, a safe harbor provision was not provided for
smaller entities in the earlier draft. 101
94

Social Security Act§ 1128(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b).

95

Harvey L. Tempkin, MedicareFraudandAbuse, 62 Wis. Law. 13 (Aug. 1989). DHHS
released the proposed regulations for publication in the Federal Register on Dec. 23,
1988. The proposed regulations were rescinded on Dec. 28,1988. On Jan. 23, 1989, the
Federal Register published a new version of the proposed regulations. Id.
96
See MMPPPA, supra note 4.
97

1d.

9856 Fed. Reg. 35,953 (1991) Rules and Regulations.
99

1d.

100

1d.

10153 Fed. Reg. 51,856 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001). This is only a proposal at
this time with possible requirements of:
a. Bona fide opportunity to invest is made on an equal basis to referral
and non-referral sources;
b. no referral requirement;
c. payments not related to referrals; and
d. ownership interest is disclosed.
Final regulations were handed down in July 1991 in similar form.
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Because of significant business investment activity in joint enterprises, the
final regulations added a safe harbor provision to cover small entities.102 The
first type of investment interest requires, among other things, "that the
opportunity to invest be open to investors regardless of whether they are in a
position to make referrals.' 10 3 In addition, investors would receive a return
proportionate to their investment which could not be in relation to the volume
or value of referrals provided to the investment. 104 The second type of
investment involves "situations where the investor has a significant
management role in the entity," including certain limited partnerships and
managing partnerships. 10 Like the first situation, investors would receive a
return proportional to their investments not predicated on referrals to the
investment.106
The addition of this safe harbor enables health care attorneys to advise
hospitals and other medical provider clients about proposed revenue
enhancing arrangements with greater clarity. Since the regulatory language is
narrow and each of the requirements must be met for compliance, a health care
provider can structure and implement revenue enhancing ventures in harmony
with the statutory requirements consistently and fairly.
B. Space and Equipment Rentals
One of the many controversies surrounding the MMAKS involves the rental
of space or medical equipment owned by another health provider. Space rentals
are usually between laboratories or other diagnostic services and physicians.
The laboratories or diagnostic facilities provide physicians with rental
payments for the use of the physician's office, from which patients may be
referred to the lab.107 A Safe Harbor exemption exists for such an arrangement
if the rental agreement meets several requirements including having a periodic
agreement of at least one year in writing.108 Furthermore, the rental payment
must be set in advance and cannot be founded on the number of referred
patients to be served on the premises. 109 Finally, the rental charge must reflect

10242 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1991).
103 See Tempkin, supra note 95, at 13.
104

1d.

105Md.
106
107

d.at 13.
See Tempkin, supra note 95, at 13.

10842 C.F.R. § 1001.952(2)(b) (1991).
109

Id.
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the fair market value of the space.110 The same conditions apply to equipment
rental as apply to space rental.111
Most providers find that the ambiguity of this provision lies in the regulatory
terms "fair market value." The view that this safe harbor does not furnish clear
guidance is not shared by the OIG, the HHS Department charged with
enforcing the regulations. 112 The Secretary of HI-IS created this provision fully
aware of sham lease arrangements in which rented space may not be large
enough or otherwise suitable to perform the services for which the rent was
paid.113 The provision, however, is conclusive and dictates that fair market
value be defined as the "[vialue for.., general commercial purposes, not
reflecting additional value attributed by either party because of proximity to
referrals." 114 Accordingly, fraudulent lease arrangements may take the form of
a diagnostic laboratory service paying a physician a rental payment for leasing
a portion of the physician's building, often a closet not intended for use,
although doing so in order to obtain the referrals. 115 In such a situation, if the
physician refers her or his patients to that laboratory or diagnostic facility, the
11 6
rent is considered a remuneration and hence a violation of the statute.
The creation of this exemption recognizes the ability of hospitals and
corporate medical providers to alleviate the inherent financial risks for
individual medical providers who rent space or highly-priced medical
equipment. 117 By allowing non-abusive hospital-physician arrangements, the
HHS is fostering the growth of an efficient health care delivery system, not
curtailing it. In light of the devastating troubles federally funded medical
assistance programs are currently enduring, medical providers should
reevaluate their contentions with the HHS's and OIG's efforts to accommodate
the medical profession's so-called "competitive plight."

11056 Fed. Reg. 35,972 (1991).
111Jd.
112
Teresa Hudson, Narrow 'Safe Harbors' May Create Tough Choices for Hospitals,
HOSPITALs, Oct. 5,1991, at 32.

"We believe these regulations dramatically increase the level of guidance

to the health care sector," says Thomas S.Crane, an OIG attorney and
principal author of the 'Safe Harbors." 'This is the first time providers will
know with certainty how to structure a business arrangement that will not
violate the Statute."
Id.
113Id.

11442 C.F.R. § 1001.952.
115

Safe Harbor Regulations [Part II, No. 663] Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH)
J 35954-55 (August 5, 1991).
116

1d. This provision, unlike its predecessor, deleted the prohibition of considering in

the rental price the intended use of the space, thereby allowing leeway in generating
fair market value for rented space.
1 7

1 1d.
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V. RECENTLY PROPOSED LEGISLATION-HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT AND

REFORM ACT OF 1992

Congress' latest attempt to control fraud and abuse in the federally funded
medical assistance programs, H.R. 5502, the Health Care Cost Containment and
Reform Act of 1992, was favorably reported by the Subcommittee on Health of
the Committee on Ways and Means to the full Committee on Ways and Means,
U.S. House of Representatives, on July 1, 1992.118 Among other things, the
measure would require the Secretary of the HHS to establish and coordinate a
national health care fraud-control program to restrict fraud and abuse in
private and public health care programs. 119 More importantly, the fraud and
abuse staff within the OIG would be increased to administer the national health
care fraud-control program. 120 The bill authorizes an increase in the QIG
budget of $250 million in 1994, $300 million in 1995, $350 million in 1996, and
$400 million in 1997.121 Finally, the bill would establish more severe criminal
penalties and possible fines including triple damages for accepting kickbacks
for violating the MMAKS. 122
VI. CONCLUSION

While it may be unclear as to whether fraud and abuse thrives at the same
level as it has previously, one thing is clear, and that is the purpose and language
of the MMAKS. Congress enacted the MMAKS for the specific purpose of
combatting fraudulent remuneration schemes that, directly or indirectly,
increase the overall cost of federally funded medical assistance programs. The
subsequent acts and amendments to the MMAKS, in contrast to the arguments
put forth by health care providers, have brought clarity and precision to its
prohibitions. Further, Congress, recognizing the possibility of thwarting
legitimate business ventures in the health care industry, has provided
additional guidance by detailing transactions in which medical providers can
engage without fear of prosecution. If medical providers follow the 'Safe
Harbor' regulations and proscriptions of the MMAKS, the likelihood of
prosecution will be minimized.
It is only through legislative efforts such as these that the evil of fraud and
abuse in federal and state funded medical assistance programs can be
eradicated. As long as prosecutors are flooded with higher priority cases that
118

House Subcommittee on Health Reports Health Care Reform Bill, [July] Medicare
and Medicaid Guide. (CCH) No. 704, at 4 (July 16,1992).
119
1d. at 8. The bill would provide that any physician participating in a public or
private health care program could not refer patients to other health care providers who
provide certain specified services with which the physician has a financial relationship.

Id.
12 0

1d.

12 1

1d.

122

1d.
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attract more community interest and support, there will continue to be a lack
of convictions.
DURIN B. ROGERS

